

# Vulnerability Handling



# About the Lecturer

Lead Auditor for Management Systems, with expertise in information security, artificial intelligence, IT services, quality management, and related domains.

Chairman of the Institute for Artificial Intelligence.

Deputy Manager of the Bulgarian Union of Standardizers.

Active contributor to numerous European and national cybersecurity projects, with a focus on standards, resilience, and digital transformation.

Assistant Professor at UniBIT, teaching:

- Cybersecurity Standards
- Cybersecurity Management
- Cryptography
- Zero Trust Architectures

# Workshop 3

## Vulnerability Handling

- **Session 1: CRA & SBOM in Practice -** Understanding regulatory requirements and how Software Bill of Materials supports transparency and supply chain security.
- **Session 2: OSCRAT Workflow Demonstration -** Live demonstration of the end-to-end vulnerability handling process – scanning, identification, tracking, and reporting.
- **Session 3: Standards & Frameworks -** Overview of key standards and best practices, including ISO, NIST, ENISA, and OWASP, and how they support a structured approach to vulnerability management.



# The Cyber Resilience Act & SBOM in Practice


From Regulatory Mandate to DevSecOps Operations.

|                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| <b>REGULATION:</b> | EU 2024/2847                                  |
| <b>SCOPE:</b>      | Products with Digital Elements                |
| <b>FRAMEWORK:</b>  | Security Lifecycle & Vulnerability Management |




# A PERMANENT SHIFT IN MANUFACTURER RESPONSIBILITY


The CRA transitions security from a post-market afterthought to a legally mandated, continuous lifecycle requirement.



# THE COUNTDOWN TO COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING OPERATIONS



# DEFINING THE SCOPE AND REGULATORY TARGETS



# Unpacking the Essential Requirements of Annex I

| ANNEX I, PART I  | ANNEX I, PART II   |
|--|--|
| Product Properties (State at Launch)   | Vulnerability Handling (Continuous Processes)  |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="259 709 1602 840"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Delivered without known exploitable vulnerabilities <span style="float: right;">-</span></li><li data-bbox="259 864 1602 958"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Secure by default configurations <span style="float: right;">-</span></li><li data-bbox="259 983 1602 1133"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Protection of data integrity and confidentiality <span style="float: right;">-</span></li><li data-bbox="259 1157 1602 1251"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Minimization of data footprint <span style="float: right;">-</span></li><li data-bbox="259 1275 1602 1369"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Resilience against denial of service attacks <span style="float: right;">-</span></li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="1802 709 3152 840"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Identify and document components via machine-readable SBOM <span style="float: right;">-</span></li><li data-bbox="1802 864 3152 958"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Address vulnerabilities without delay <span style="float: right;">-</span></li><li data-bbox="1802 983 3152 1133"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Provide security updates separate from feature updates <span style="float: right;">-</span></li><li data-bbox="1802 1157 3152 1251"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Execute regular security testing and reviews <span style="float: right;">-</span></li><li data-bbox="1802 1275 3152 1369"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enforce a Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) policy <span style="float: right;">-</span></li></ul> |

**Crucial Insight:** The CRA does not stop at "Secure-by-Design". It demands a sustainable, provable process for vulnerability management throughout the product's active lifespan.


# The Support Period & Security Update Mandate

## Support Duration

Manufacturers must determine a support period of at least 5 years (unless the expected product lifetime is shorter).

## Separation of Concerns

Security updates must be distributed **separately** from functional or feature upgrades to ensure **rapid deployment**.




## Automation

**Automatic update capabilities** are required by default, featuring a clear and transparent user **opt-out mechanism**.


## Cost & Velocity

Security patches must be delivered **without delay**, **free of charge** to the user throughout the support period.

# Translating Legal Mandates into the Vulnerability Management Workflow




# The Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) as the Compliance Bridge



**The Core Premise:** You cannot remediate, patch, or report a vulnerability within a strict 24-hour legal window if you lack an automated, machine-readable inventory. SBOM is the mandatory fuel for CRA compliance.

# SBOM Standards Face-Off: CycloneDX vs. SPDX

Evaluating utility strictly through the lens of CRA compliance and Vulnerability Management.

| Dimension                   | CycloneDX (v1.7)   | SPDX (v3.0.1)  |
|-----------------------------|--|--|
| Primary Focus               | Supply chain security, precise dependencies, and VEX.  | Package licensing, deep component relationships, and legal compliance. |
| Vulnerability / VEX Support | Native, first-class objects for vulnerability disclosure and VEX routing.  | Relies heavily on external identifiers and profiles for VM workflows.  |
| Serialization               | JSON, XML, Protobuf.   | Defined semantic data model supporting multiple format serializations. |
| CRA & DevSecOps Fitness     | Highly practical for automated DevSecOps pipelines and VM integration.  | Excellent for deep compliance auditing and complex legal tracing.      |

Note: The CRA does not legally mandate one specific standard, but emerging technical profiles (e.g., BSI TR-03183-2) require validation against either format.

# Constructing the Target CRA SBOM Profile

## Machine-Readable SBOM JSON Snippet

```
1 {  
2   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",  
3   "specVersion": "1.5",  
4   "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:3e671687-395b-41f5-a39f-a58921a69b79",  
5   "version": 1,  
6   "metadata": {  
7     "timestamp": "2023-10-27T12:00:00Z",  
8     "tools": [  
9       {  
10        "vendor": "ACRE Solutions",  
11        "name": "SBOM Generator",  
12        "version": "2.8.1"  
13      }  
14    ],  
15    "component": {  
16      "type": "application",  
17      "name": "Critical Infra Core",  
18      "version": "1.0.0",  
19      "purl": "pkg:generic/critical-infra-core@1.0.0"  
20    }  
21  },  
22  "components": [  
23    {  
24      "type": "library",  
25      "name": "SecureLib",  
26      "version": "3.2.1",  
27      "purl": "pkg:npm/securelib@3.2.1",  
28      "cpe": "cpe:2.5:a:securelib:securelib:3.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",  
29      "licenses": [...]  
30    },  
31  ],  
32  "dependencies": [  
33    {  
34      "ref": "pkg:generic/critical-infra-core@1.0.0",  
35      "dependsOn": [  
36        "pkg:npm/securelib@3.2.1"  
37      ]  
38    },  
39    {  
40      "ref": "pkg:npm/securelib@3.2.1",  
41      "dependsOn": [  
42        "pkg:npm/transitive-dep@1.1.0"  
43      ]  
44    }  
45  ]  
46 }  
47 }
```

### Format Specification

JSON or XML serialization only. Must be strictly machine-readable.

### Dependency Depth

Recursive dependency resolution. Must capture top-level dependencies and traverse transitively to enable accurate chaining.

### Required Minimum Metadata

Must explicitly include Creator, Timestamp, Component Name, Version, and stable Identifiers (PURL/CPE).


### Statelessness Principle

The SBOM must remain static to the specific build version. Dynamic vulnerability data (VEX) should be maintained as a separate, associated.




BSI TR-03183-2  
PROFILE SATISFIED

# The Continuous CI/CD Automation Pipeline




**WARNING:** Manual SBOM generation is dead. It is fundamentally incompatible with modern release cadences and strict CRA reporting timelines.

# Supercharging Vulnerability Management with VEX



# The CRA Incident Reporting Decision Tree (Article 14)



# The CRA Readiness Matrix


| Strategic Action  | Primary Owner              | Target Deadline |
|---|----------------------------|-----------------|
| Define Support Period & Map Ecosystem Roles                                       | Product Management / Legal | Q2 2026         |
| Establish Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) Policy & Public security.txt | PSIRT / Communications     | Q3 2026         |
| Implement CI/CD SBOM Automation & Cryptographic Signing                           | DevSecOps / Engineering    | September 2026  |
| Integrate ENISA SRP Reporting Runbooks & 24h Triage Workflows                     | PSIRT / Compliance         | September 2026  |

# Beyond Compliance: The New Standard for Software Trust

The **Cyber Resilience Act** is not a paperwork exercise. It is a fundamental architectural shift toward continuous, transparent, and automated supply chain security.

Start building your automation pipeline today. The critical reporting window opens in **September 2026**.





# Vulnerability Management: Standards & Frameworks

A **Strategic Blueprint** to the ISO, NIST, ENISA, and OWASP Ecosystems

Navigating the complete lifecycle from secure design to coordinated disclosure and enterprise patching.

# The Six Pillars of Vulnerability Management

## ENISA Security by Design

Pre-release. Building security in from day one.



## NIST SP 800-40

End-User Defense. Enterprise Patch Management.




## OWASP Dependency-Check

Development. Securing the software supply chain.



## ENISA CVD

Macro Policy. Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure.



No single standard covers everything. True resilience requires integrating these interlocking frameworks across the software lifecycle.

## ISO/IEC 29147

External Interface. Vulnerability Disclosure.




## ISO/IEC 30111

Internal Engine. Vulnerability Handling.



# ENISA Security by Design (SbD)

Based on the upcoming comprehensive guide (targeted March 2026), moving SbD from theoretical concept to engineering reality. Eradicate vulnerabilities before they are written.



# OWASP Dependency-Check: Software Composition Analysis

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## The Problem

Modern applications are assembled, not written. Patching dependencies requires code changes and full regression testing.

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
## The Solution

An automated SCA utility that identifies project dependencies and checks if there are publicly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVEs) mapped via the National Vulnerability Database (NVD).

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## Implementation

Integrates directly into the CI/CD pipeline (Maven, Gradle, Jenkins) to act as a quality gate, automatically failing builds if known critical vulnerabilities are detected.



# ISO/IEC 29147: The External Interface

Establishing safe, standardized interactions between vendors and external vulnerability finders.



## Disclosure Policy (VDP)

Publish clear guidelines outlining safe harbor provisions, scope, and reporting expectations.

## Secure Receipt


Provide confidential reporting mechanisms (e.g., HTTPS web forms, TLS) so sensitive exploit data is not intercepted.

## Standardized Advisories

Publish consistent remediation information with clear severity ratings (like CVSS) to allow users to make informed risk decisions.


# ISO/IEC 30111: The Internal Engine

The internal processes vendors use to investigate, triage, and resolve vulnerabilities.



# The Disclosure-Handling Symbiosis


ISO 29147 acts as the front door interfacing with the public. ISO 30111 operates as the kitchen processing the fix. They are mutually dependent.



# ENISA CVD: The Macro Policy Level

Harmonizing Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure across national borders to protect ethical hackers and systemic infrastructure.

|  |
|--|
| <b>Legal Safe Harbor</b>   |
| Defining the role of ethical hackers in national law to prevent prosecution for good-faith security research.        |
| <b>The Coordinator Role</b>  |
| Utilizing National CSIRTs/CERTs as neutral mediators, especially when multiple vendors are affected or unresponsive. |
| <b>Ecosystem Incentives</b>  |
| Encouraging bug bounties and active participation from the global security research community.                       |



# NIST SP 800-40: Enterprise Patch Management

**The Mindset Shift:** Patching is not an IT burden; it is preventive maintenance and a fundamental cost of doing business.

Exploit Window

Manual Process: Wide Exploit Window

Automated Patching:  
Minimized Exploit Window

Automation Gate

## Simplify & Automate

It is impossible to manually risk-assess every CVE. Use automation to scale deployments swiftly.

## Maintenance Groups

Segment enterprise assets based on risk and apply pre-defined response scenarios (Routine, Emergency, Unpatchable).

## Accept the Friction

Occasional operational disruption from a patch is a necessary, acceptable trade-off to prevent catastrophic network compromise.

# Synthesis 1: The Lifecycle Intersection

## Creation Phase

Prevent vulnerabilities from shipping.



Node A  
ENISA SbD:  
Architectural blueprints  
and secure defaults.



Roboto Mono  
OWASP: Auditing code  
and third-party  
dependencies.



Node C  
Roboto Mono  
ISO 29147: The reporter  
safely submits the bug.



Roboto Mono  
ENISA CVD: National  
coordinators mediate  
complex disclosures.



Node E  
Roboto Mono  
ISO 30111: The vendor  
engineers the patch.



Roboto Mono  
NIST 800-40: The  
enterprise installs  
the patch.

## Creation Phase

Prevent vulnerabilities from shipping.

## Discovery Phase

Safe, structured communication of flaws.

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Safe, structured communication of flaws.

## Operation Phase

Swift risk reduction and execution.

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Swift risk reduction and execution.

# Synthesis 2: The Stakeholder Matrix

| Framework                 | Primary Actor                 | Key Output                   | Core Objective            |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| OWASP<br>Dependency-Check | Developers                    | Clean Code / SBOM            | Supply Chain<br>Security  |
| ISO 30111 &<br>ENISA SbD  | Software Vendors              | Secure Products<br>& Patches | Product Integrity         |
| ISO 29147 &<br>ENISA CVD  | Coordinators &<br>Researchers | Advisories & VDP<br>Policies | Transparent<br>Disclosure |
| NIST SP 800-40            | Enterprise IT /<br>Security   | Updated Assets               | Operational<br>Defense    |

# Synthesis 3: The Unified Application Path

## Step 1: Procurement

Demand that software vendors prove adherence to ENISA SbD principles and OWASP dependency checks before purchase.

## Step 2: Preparation

Establish your organization's own Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (ISO 29147) and structure an internal triage process (ISO 30111).

## Step 3: Execution

Leverage NIST 800-40 to heavily automate your consumption of the patches generated by your upstream vendors.

## Step 4: Escalation


Utilize ENISA CVD guidelines to engage national CSIRTs if systemic, multi-vendor vulnerabilities threaten your infrastructure.

## Step 3: Execution

Leverage NIST 800-40 to heavily automate your consumption of the patches generated by your upstream vendors.

## Step 2: Preparation

Establish your organization's own Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (ISO 29147) and structure an internal triage process (ISO 30111).



# Conclusion: A Holistic Security Posture

## 01 Shift Left & Right

Security is not a single phase. It requires proactive action at code inception (OWASP, SbD) and continuous defensive operation (NIST, ISO).

## 02 Communication is Security

Standardized disclosure (CVD, 29147) prevents operational chaos, protects ethical researchers, and delivers fixes to users faster.

## 03 Automation & Policy

Without automation, enterprise patching fails. Without policy, disclosure fails. Architect both to survive the modern threat landscape.

# Next workshop

## Risk Management

- Identify and assess risks using likelihood and impact
- Apply appropriate risk treatment strategies: accept, reduce, avoid, or transfer
- Maintain a structured risk register linked to tasks and supporting evidence
- Ensure full traceability and auditability of risk-related decisions



**Date: 27 April 2026**



**Platform: Zoom**

# Thank you!

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