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**Regulation (EU) 2024/2847**

# How Organizations Should Prepare for the Cyber Resilience Act

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# Introduction



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
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


# How Organizations Should Prepare for the Cyber Resilience Act

*Gap Analysis & Internal Policies*



# CRA: What It Really Requires





## Cyber Risk Assessment as Part of Technical Documentation

- Strong cybersecurity requirements for the product (Annex I Part I)
  - Strong cybersecurity processes inside the organization (Annex I Part II)
  - Risk assessment & vulnerability handling (Article 13)
  - Reporting obligations for exploited vulnerabilities & incidents (Article 14)
  - Evidence, documentation & CE marking readiness (Articles 31–44)
- 

# Why You Need a CRA Gap Analysis

**A CRA gap analysis helps you understand:**

- What CRA actually requires
- Where your current controls fall short
- What processes are missing
- What documentation is not yet available
- What must be fixed before CE marking is possible



# What Your CRA Gap Analysis Must Cover?

## 1. Product cybersecurity requirements

- Secure-by-default, no known exploitable vulnerabilities, data protection (Annex I Part I)

## 2. Organizational process requirements

- Secure development, updates, testing, logging, vulnerability handling (Annex I Part II)

## 3. Article 13 readiness

- Cybersecurity risk assessment
- Support period
- Vulnerability handling capabilities

## 4. Article 14 readiness

- Ability to report exploited vulnerabilities and incidents within deadlines

## 5. Documentation & CE marking readiness

- Technical file (Annex VII)
- Evidence of security controls


# Product Context: IoT Environmental Sensor

## Example Product:

An IoT environmental sensor measuring temperature, humidity, air quality (PM2.5), and CO<sub>2</sub> levels. Data is sent to a cloud dashboard. Device supports OTA updates.

### Includes:

- Embedded firmware
- Wireless connectivity
- Mobile or web app
- Backend API
- OTA update mechanism
- Cloud platform for monitoring




### CRA relevance:

IoT devices fall directly under the CRA because they contain:

- *digital elements*
- *connectivity*
- *software components (firmware + cloud)*
- *security-sensitive data*

# CRA GAP Analysis — IoT Environmental Sensor




## PRODUCT REQUIREMENTS (Annex I Part I)

CRA Reference	Requirement	Current State	GAP	Impact	Priority
Annex I Part I(2)(a)	No known exploitable vulnerabilities	No automated vulnerability scanning	Missing automated firmware scanning & CVE tracking	High likelihood of unnoticed vulnerabilities	<b>High</b>
Annex I Part I(2)(b)	Secure-by-default	Device ships with default admin password	Not secure-by-default; no forced password change	Device takeover possible	<b>Critical</b>
Annex I Part I(2)(c)	Minimize attack surface	Open debug port (UART) left active	Insecure design	Physical & remote attacks easier	<b>High</b>
Annex I Part I(3)	Protect data	Weak encryption (AES-128 without key rotation)	No key lifecycle	Data confidentiality risk	<b>Medium–High</b>




# CRA GAP Analysis — IoT Environmental Sensor



## PROCESS REQUIREMENTS (Annex I Part II)

CRA Reference	Requirement	Current State	GAP	Impact	Priority
Annex I Part II(1)	Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL)	Developers follow informal coding practices	No SDL policy, no threat modeling	Quality & security inconsistent	High
Annex I Part II(1)(b)	SBOM	Dependencies known internally but not exported	No automated SBOM for firmware or cloud	Cannot track component vulnerabilities	High
Annex I Part II(5)	Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD)	No security.txt file; no reporting mechanism	No CVD policy	Cannot intake external reports	Critical
Annex I Part II(7)	Logging & monitoring	Minimal device logs; no tamper detection	Insufficient monitoring capability	Hard to detect exploitation	Medium
Annex I Part II(8)	Secure updates	OTA updates not signed	Insecure update channel	Firmware injection possible	Critical



# CRA GAP Analysis — IoT Environmental Sensor

## ARTICLE 13 — RISK ASSESSMENT & VULNERABILITY HANDLING

Requirement	Current State	GAP	Priority
Cybersecurity risk assessment	Not performed	No documented method	<b>High</b>
Support period ( $\geq 5$ years recommended)	Unspecified	Missing a formal decision	<b>Medium</b>
Vulnerability handling process	Handled informally via email	Missing triage, SLA, documentation	<b>Critical</b>

# CRA GAP Analysis — IoT Environmental Sensor

## ARTICLE 14 — REPORTING OBLIGATIONS


Requirement	Current State	GAP	Priority
24-hour Early Warning to ENISA	No defined workflow	Cannot comply with CRA deadlines	<b>Critical</b>
72-hour Vulnerability Report	No template / SLA	Missing entire reporting structure	<b>High</b>
Final remediation report	Not implemented	No tracking of vulnerability lifecycle	<b>Medium–High</b>

# CRA GAP Analysis — IoT Environmental Sensor

## ANNEX VII — TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION

Requirement	Current State	GAP	Priority
Risk assessment documentation	Missing	Cannot produce technical file	<b>High</b>
Architecture diagrams	Fragmented	Needs formal structure	<b>Medium</b>
SBOM	Missing machine-readable SBOM	Required for CE	<b>High</b>
Evidence (tests, updates, logs)	Minimal	Must be collected systematically	<b>High</b>

# CRA-Required Internal Policies




**To comply with CRA, organizations need internal policies for:**

- Cybersecurity Risk Assessment (Art. 13)
  - Vulnerability Handling Process (Art. 13 + Annex I Part II)
  - Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) (Annex I Part II(5))
  - Secure Development & Secure Lifecycle Management (Annex I Part II(1))
  - Security Update Management (Annex I Part II(8))
  - Monitoring & Logging Requirements (Annex I Part II)
  - Incident Notification Procedure (Art. 14)
  - Technical Documentation Management (Annex VII)
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
# What These Policies Should Actually Contain

- **Risk Assessment Policy** – Method, scope, responsibilities, support period determination
- **Vulnerability Handling Procedure** – Identification > triage > remediation > communication > evidence
- **CVD Policy** – Public contact point, intake procedures, response timelines
- **Secure Development Policy** – Coding standards, reviews, testing, supply-chain controls
- **Update Management Policy** – Secure delivery, signing, rollback, update logs
- **Incident Notification Procedure** – Internal escalation + CRA 24/72h requirements


# Typical Gaps We See in Organizations



- No secure development lifecycle (SDL)
- No formal vulnerability handling workflow
- No SBOM creation or maintenance
- No documented risk assessment per Article 13
- No public CVD channel
- No internal capability to report exploited vulnerabilities within 24 hours
- Missing technical documentation required for CE marking



**Next: How to Create a CRA Compliance  
Roadmap – A Practical Walkthrough**



# THANK YOU

FOR YOUR ATTENTION

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